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Introduction 
The Green Revolution did not leave the same mark on agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
as elsewhere. The failure of African agriculture to feed her growing population along 
with increasing concern about natural resource degradation, combine to paint a bleak 
picture of the prospects for poverty alleviation on this continent. But beneficial 
innovations that can help bring African agriculture out of its current state of stagnation do 
exist. However, their adoption is slow, and a better understanding of the adoption process 
and constraints to adoption is needed to guide policymakers in designing appropriate 
policies to stimulate technology adoption. This study seeks to improve our understanding 
of the role social networks play in the adoption of new agricultural technologies.  
This study looks at adoption of improved natural resource management 
techniques in two very densely populated sites in Kenya, Embu in Eastern Province, and 
Vihiga in Western Province. Both sites enjoy high, bimodal rainfall, and both are 
considered areas of high agricultural potential. The technologies considered in this study 
are soil and water conservation practices and soil fertility management practices that are 
components of integrated natural resource management. The soil and water conservation 
practices considered are terraces and drainage structures. The soil fertility management 
practices include chemical fertilizers, mulching and tumbukiza. Tumbukiza is a Swahili 
word that means “submerge”, and refers to planting crops in deep manure-filled pits, a 
technique that leads to deep incorporation of organic fertilizers into the soil. Mulching 
(covering the soil surface with plant residues) is a technique that protects the topsoil from Social Networks and Technology Adoption    3 
rain and wind erosion in addition to providing organic matter, so it may serve as both a 
soil conservation and a soil nutrient management technique.  
Finally, trees on farms are part of an integrated natural resource management 
system. Trees may be planted for their products for human consumption as either food or 
medicine, such as fruits, nuts, or leaves (tree crops). Other uses are provision of biomass 
that can either be used as animal feed or organic fertilizers, as mulching material or 
supplementing other organic material used in composts (agroforestry trees). Nitrogen-
fixating trees have the same beneficial effect on the soil nutrient balance as leguminous 
herbs, and in addition, trees supplement the nutrient mobilizing capacity of leguminous 
herbs by extracting soil nutrients from deeper strata of the soil, making them available for 
plants with shallower root systems, for example, through the leaves they shed. Trees can 
also be planted as windbreaks or for shade, thereby improving the microclimate on the 
farmers’ plots, and their root systems help bind soil and prevent erosion. Thus, trees are 
useful components of both a soil conservation and a soil nutrient management regime. In 
this study 3 such techniques are considered. They are tree crops, agroforestry trees and 
windbreaks. 
Some of these techniques are well-known, and have been practiced for 
generations. In colonial times, the British launched large-scale tree-planting and terracing 
projects in Kenya in response to observations of severe soil erosion problems. After 
independence, adoption of both trees and terracing picked up in many places, and as a 
result, areas that were deemed seriously degraded generations ago now support much 
higher population densities than before without additional damage to the environment 
(Tiffen et al. 1994). But terraces require costly maintenance, without which their benefits Social Networks and Technology Adoption    4 
are gradually lost over time. Thus, ongoing maintenance becomes an issue, in particular 
when the agricultural sector experiences adverse changes in the terms of trade.  
Application of fertilizers is also a well-known technique that most farm 
households have experience with. But chemical fertilizers have become more expensive 
following the removal of government subsidies, discouraging their use. According to 
some studies, this shift in prices has caused a shift to more intensive utilization of organic 
fertilizers instead (Scoones 2001), but this shift may not compensate for the reduction in 
application of chemical fertilizers. The adoption rate of these technologies can hardly be 
attributed to the level of awareness of their benefits, but rather to other factors, mainly 
related to market incentives. But the technology packet considered in this study also 
includes less-known methods to improve traditional techniques, such as the use of 
agroforestry, mulching, or the deep incorporation of organic fertilizers into the soil that is 
achieved with tumbukiza.  
Removal of trade barriers and improved terms of trade for the agricultural sector 
were high on the agenda for policymakers during the structural adjustment process in the 
past couple of decades, and experience confirmed that farmers do respond to market 
incentives (Sanders et al. 1996). However, after decades of structural adjustment, 
agricultural productivity remains stagnant. Part of the explanation may be that structural 
adjustment policies did not, in fact, improve terms of trade as much as anticipated (ref?), 
but another explanation may be that other barriers to technology adoption remain, and 
these may be related to non-market factors. Recently, there has been increased interest 
among development scholars in the importance of informal institutions to technology 
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The problem is that institutions are very diverse, and deeply embedded in social 
structures that are shaped by both the local environment and by non-material factors, such 
as culture. Thus, policies that have been proven successful in some institutional settings 
may turn out to be inappropriate in others. An example is the variable success of 
microfinance schemes throughout the developing world (Morduch 2000), once hailed as 
the key to unlock poverty traps in traditional economies. Another example is the 
perplexing multitude of contracts that are found among villagers, even in settings where 
according to economic theory they are inefficient, and yet, policy interventions to make 
people choose the assumed efficient contracts have had perverse outcomes (Hoff and 
Stiglitz 1993). 
Social network effects on technology adoption have been demonstrated, and are 
often attributed to social learning, but other less studied network effects may also be 
involved. The services social networks provide that may interact with peasant farmers’ 
technology adoption decisions are, at least, threefold. A social learning environment is 
one of those services, while the other two are informal finance that may relax the 
farmers’ credit or risk tolerance constraints, and facilitation of collective action where 
coordination of adoption is needed due to technological externalities. Each of these 
services interacts with a farmer’s adoption choice through its own set of mechanisms that 
may be complex and contradictory. 
The classic studies of social learning showed that the aggregate adoption pattern 
follows a sigmoid curve, with adoption accelerating in an early stage, and then 
decelerating as adoption reaches an upper limit after some time. In the classical literature, 
adopters have been characterized as “innovators” or “laggards”, depending on when Social Networks and Technology Adoption    6 
during the adoption process any given adopter adopted (Rogers 1995). This sigmoid 
curve is also typical for the spread of diseases, and is often referred to as the “contagion 
model”, which implies an underlying assumption about a social mechanism behind the 
adoption pattern. In a study of adoption of Green Revolution technologies in India, Foster 
and Rosenzweig (1995) found that learning externalities within social networks increased 
the profitability of adoption, but also that farmers appeared to be free-riding on 
neighbors’ costly experimentation with the new technology. Bandiera and Rasul (2002) 
suggest learning externalities generate opposite effects, such that the more other people 
also engage in experimentation with a new technology, the more beneficial it is to join in, 
but also the more beneficial it is to free-ride on the experimentation of others. As a result 
of these contradictory effects, they propose an inverted U-shaped individual adoption 
curve, implying that network effects are positive at low rates of adoption, but negative at 
high rates of adoption. 
Technical aspects of agricultural technologies themselves are often overlooked as 
factors that may drive adoption patterns. When technologies are complementary, and 
several technologies need to be adopted simultaneously to be successful, then adoption 
becomes complicated, and perceived as risky. Farmers prefer to adopt technologies 
gradually, one by one, to experiment with them on a small scale before applying them to 
the whole farm (Sanders et al. 1996). But the integrated natural resource management 
techniques that are needed to address natural resource degradation in Africa commonly fit 
the description of complementary technologies (Fernandes et al. 2002). It may be 
possible to adopt and apply them individually, but the full benefits of adoption are only 
achieved when they are all applied simultaneously.  Social Networks and Technology Adoption    7 
In general, externalities are not internalized by economic decision makers, leading 
to “too much” or “too little” adoption in the absence of external intervention. A stark 
example is vaccination against a communicable disease, which interferes with the cycle 
of transmission of the disease, generating positive externalities that may be of greater 
social importance than the protection the vaccination provides for the individual. Where 
public benefits of a technology outweigh the private ones, people are less likely to adopt 
them (Miguel and Kremer 2003). Similar dynamics also exist for improved natural 
resource management techniques. 
Where a sloping terrain and precipitation combine to generate problems with soil 
erosion, well constructed terraces may have positive externalities, while poorly 
constructed drainage structures may have negative externalities on downhill neighbors. 
For a farmer in need of soil conservation measures, having an uphill neighbor who drains 
excess water onto her land, or who has not terraced, can make terracing unprofitable, 
because excess water from the neighbor may damage these structures. Similarly, 
irrigation water that is returned to a river and is reused downstream becomes increasingly 
more saline with each time it is used, creating an externality that affects downstream 
water users. In the Colorado River Basin such problems have been addressed through 
costly public interventions intended to protect the interests of post-irrigation water users 
(Lee and Howitt 1996). Similar interventions to improve aggregate productivity of 
farmland through socially optimal investments in soil and water conservation structures 
are beyond the economic capacity of most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In the rural economy in Africa, few have access to formal finance. Instead, many 
rely on informal finance. The most important sources of informal finance in rural Africa Social Networks and Technology Adoption    8 
are (or have been) (i) interlinked contracts, where input purchases and output sales are 
made through the same marketing channels, (ii) private money lenders, and (iii) transfers 
within social networks. Much of the interlinked inputs and outputs trade used to take 
place within inefficient parastatals, which were targeted for dismantling during the 
structural adjustment process. As a result, this source of credit has diminished in 
importance during the last couple of decades (Kherallah et al. 2000). Furthermore, this 
source of credit only applies to a limited range of purposes directly relevant to the 
objectives of the parastatals. Private moneylenders are known to charge very high interest 
rates (Aleem 1993), at levels that often preclude the use of credit from this source for 
financing investments in smallholder farming. So for the purposes considered in this 
paper, i.e., investments in farm productivity, credit through social networks may be the 
most important source available to smallholders in Africa.  
Borrowing through social networks takes two main forms - either as a collective 
arrangement organized as a rotating savings- and credit association (ROSCA), in Kenya 
popularly known as a “merry-go-round”, or as bilateral transfers between individual 
social network members. The former is a wide-spread, well-organized institution that has 
been shown to be important within the kinship-based rural economy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, while the latter tends to be very informal, with no written contracts, and no 
explicit agreements about the terms of repayment, rather in the spirit of generalized 
reciprocity (van den Brink and Chavas 1991). Udry (1994) found in a study of bilateral 
informal credit through social networks in Northern Nigeria that both duration of loans 
and repayment amounts tended to be state contingent, with more favorable terms for 
borrowers who had experienced adverse shocks. Thus, he made the very interesting Social Networks and Technology Adoption    9 
observation that informal credit could not be clearly distinguished from informal 
insurance. Indeed, the most important role of this kind of informal finance may be to 
complement the more rigid ROSCAs in situations of emergencies, i.e., to couple informal 
credit with informal insurance.  
While in the concept of the market in classic economic theory, agents are 
anonymous, that is not the case within social networks. Many analytical studies have 
looked at endogenous formation of insurance networks, and how selection into networks 
leads to inclusion and exclusion of people according to individual characteristics. 
Empirical studies uniformly reject Pareto-efficient risk pooling in low-income rural 
villages (e.g., see Townsend 1994). Murgai et al (2002) propose that the configuration of 
mutual insurance groups and the level of insurance achieved within those groups are 
functions of transactions costs related to group formation and maintenance, i.e., 
“association” costs, and costs related to using these links when needed, i.e., “extraction” 
costs. Genicot and Ray (2003) propose that when a mutual insurance group has grown 
beyond some minimum number of members, it may be destabilized by coalition 
formation because a subset of group members finds it more beneficial to form a group of 
their own, leading to social exclusion. In a study using data from Ghana, Goldstein et al 
(2005) seek to explain who is successful in getting cash assistance and who is not, and 
from what source the assistance comes for those who succeed. In their data, they observe 
that individuals do not obtain assistance from both the spouse and community members, 
but from either one or the other. Based on this, they postulate two decision trees in 
seeking assistance, either ask the spouse first, and then others, or others first, and then the 
spouse. Spouses’ responsibilities towards each other are defined by the conjugal contract, Social Networks and Technology Adoption    10 
and whether the spouse or others are more likely to provide a transfer depends on what 
item the individual is seeking assistance to obtain. Goldstein et al find that inability to 
find cash assistance is pervasive in low-income rural communities, and, just like many 
other empirical studies on informal insurance, that those who have difficulties obtaining 
assistance are not perfectly insured. 
Clearly, the threat of exclusion from transfer or insurance networks can function 
like a Nash reversion strategy as a mechanism for contract enforcement, which would be 
particularly credible and powerful towards the vulnerable and poor. An interesting 
question following this observation is whether those with the power to exclude exert 
stronger social influence than others, and whether such influence also extends to 
decisions related to farm management and adoption of agricultural technologies.  
Hypotheses 
The three types of social network services identified above may all interact with 
technology adoption, but through different mechanisms. Moreover, these may be 
contradictory. Competing models that may or may not be mutually exclusive also exist. 
Bilateral transfers effects:  
Bilateral transfers through social networks complement other sources of finance, or even 
substitute for them where they are missing, and if this informal financial market functions 
the same way as a formal financial market does, it should have the same expected effect 
on farm management decisions. Better access to finance, of any kind, should relax 
farmers’ cash constraints, and enable them to invest more in their farms’ productivity. 
This could be termed the economic “enabling” model, implying that more credit means Social Networks and Technology Adoption    11 
more economic freedom and higher ability to adopt, and leads to the first testable 
hypothesis:  
H1: Those who have better access to informal credit (or insurance) through social 
networks are more likely to adopt new agricultural technologies. 
But, following the discussion above, due to the non-anonymous nature of 
informal finance, and the possibility of power relations within social networks, a different 
model, that may be termed the economic “power” model, can be pitted against the first 
model. In the power model, net borrowers depend economically on their lenders, and 
must somehow signal creditworthiness. From the formal economy we know that in a 
competitive credit market lenders will balance risk and price to achieve zero expected 
profit. Indeed, the distribution of risk between lender and borrower is an important 
component of formal credit contracts. The issue of risk rationing is an emerging issue for 
development economics research for more informal and less competitive financial 
markets (ref? Michael Carter?). Due to an assumed general unwillingness for informal 
lenders to carry risk, it is assumed that risk is disproportionately pushed over on the 
borrower, who therefore is forced to abstain from perceived risky, but potentially 
beneficial experimentation with new technologies, making borrowers more conservative 
than lenders with respect to technology adoption. This leads to the alternative testable 
hypothesis: 
H2: The borrowers who are most likely to become excluded from transfer networks need 
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These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Economic enabling may dominate 
in the absence of economic dependence and a credible power to exclude, while the 
pressure to behave conservatively may dominate where exclusion is a credible threat. The 
existence of these opposite effects may generate complicated adoption patterns. 
Learning effects:  
The most important and best-known model for social learning is the “learning from 
others” model, where information about new technologies spread from mouth to mouth 
through collective experimentation, discussion and persuasion or by direct observation of 
neighbors’ experiments (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995). Conversely, if a community has 
become disenchanted with a new technology, community members may succumb to 
conformity pressure and disadopt it (Moser and Barrett 2002). This model implies the 
following testable hypothesis: 
H3: The more adopters a farmer knows and interacts with through social networks, the 
more likely that farmer is to also adopt the new technology.  
Where social interaction within networks is of less importance, farmers are 
expected to learn about technologies, experiment with them, and decide whether to adopt 
more on an individual basis, and their source of knowledge about new technologies 
becomes the main issue of study. Traditionally, farmers have been assumed to be passive 
recipients of knowledge that is provided to them by change agents, such as extension 
officers or sales agents representing producers of, e.g., new machinery, seeds, or other 
farm inputs (Rogers 1995). But farmers may also be actively trying to figure out new 
ways to solve their own problems themselves, and instrumentally use social networks to Social Networks and Technology Adoption    13 
seek information they need as inputs in their own experimentation process. Since useful 
sources of information are likely to be found outside the social networks people 
participate in on a daily basis, this will often involve mobilization of weak social ties 
(Granovetter 1973). The ability to locate useful sources of information can be tested 
experimentally. Thus, two competing hypotheses emerge: 
H4: The more a farmer interacts with extension officers, the more likely she is to adopt 
new technologies. 
H5: A farmer with a greater ability to mobilize networks instrumentally (by using weak 
ties) is more likely to adopt new technologies. 
Again, these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, but may instead represent 
effects that complement and reinforce each other. A disentangling of these effects is not a 
problem worth worrying about, but it may be of interest which of these effects appear to 
be at work in the data, and which has the greater impact on adoption. 
Technological spill-over effects:  
In the presence of technological spill-over effects, or externalities, hidden incentives and 
disincentives to adoption may exist, that the adoption researcher may not observe. For the 
natural resource management techniques that are considered here, such externalities are 
probably only felt by the geographically proximate neighbors, and less so, the larger their 
farms are. Positive externalities should make people more likely to adopt if a proximate 
neighbor has adopted, while negative externalities should lead to less adoption if a 
neighbor has adopted. Negative externalities may also lead to conflicts between Social Networks and Technology Adoption    14 
neighbors, which are easily observable, and can be used to instrument for it. This brings 
us to the final hypotheses: 
H6: When adoption of a technology generates externalities that lead to observable 
conflicts between neighbors, a farmer is less likely to adopt it.  
H7: When adoption of a technology is likely to prevent externalities that lead to 
observable conflicts between neighbors, a farmer is more likely to adopt it. 
Econometric Model 
Manski (2000) identifies three sources of predictive power of a social influence model 
that cannot easily be disentangled, creating an identification problem. Those are (i) 
endogenous network effects, (ii) exogenous network effects, and (iii) correlated (non-
network) effects. It is the endogenous network effect that is usually referred to as a 
network effect, i.e., an effect generated by the network as a result of direct interaction 
between network members. Exogenous network effects are features of social networks 
that are not a result of the internal dynamics of the network, but rather a result of factors 
that are at play during the network formation process, i.e., how people get selected into 
networks. Correlated effects are effects that are external to networks, but that network 
members share with each other and with people who are not members of their networks, 
i.e., environmental factors, including institutional environment, mass media, etc. 
Moreover, correlated factors at the individual level may be driving endogenous network 
formation resulting in exogenous network effects. All of these can make members of the 
same networks choose to make similar technology adoption decisions, but only the 
endogenous effects are truly generated by the network. Social Networks and Technology Adoption    15 
  To identify endogenous effects, the analysis needs to control for exogenous and 
correlated effects. This will require data about all relevant features of all network 
members in all networks, and about all relevant environmental factors that may vary 
between or even within localities. But endogeneity of network formation probably does 
not affect all networks equally. People may choose their “friends”, but not their neighbors.  
An adoption decision can be viewed as either a binary decision, to adopt or not to 
adopt, or as a continuous decision, whether to adopt a little or a lot, i.e., what proportion 
of the farm the technique will be applied to. In this study, only binary data about the 
adoption decisions are available, which drives the choice of a Probit or a Logit model for 
the econometric analysis. But the techniques included in this study can be clustered into 
sets of complementary techniques whose adoption are probably simultaneous, so an 
analysis of their adoption through multivariate regressions should be considered. 
Data 
The data used in this study were collected during 2003-2004 in two sites in Kenya: 
Manyatta Division in Embu District, and the former Madzuu Division (now divided 
between several new political entities) in Vihiga District, in Eastern and Western 
Provinces, respectively. Both sites enjoy high, bimodal rainfall patterns, and are 
considered high-potential areas for agricultural production. Both sites are also extremely 
densely populated areas. But the ethnicity of the population differs between the two sites, 
with Embu dominated by the Embu tribe, while the population in Vihiga belongs to the Social Networks and Technology Adoption    16 
Luhya tribe
1. These two tribes are culturally different, with different languages and 
histories, including different histories of interaction with the English during colonial 
times. Embu also has somewhat more favorable economic conditions than Vihiga, 
because of generally less degraded soil, and better market access. Embu is situated about 
120 km from Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, while Vihiga is about 400 km from Nairobi, 
but about 25 km from Kenya’s third largest city, Kisumu. 
The sample of research subjects was given in both sites, as this study was 
conducted under the umbrella of a larger interdisciplinary study, which I will here refer to 
as the BASIS study, involving about 120 households in each site
2. The objective of this 
larger study is to investigate the dynamic interactions between subsistence agriculture 
and the natural resource base it depends on, and it involves building a panel data set for 
the sample households. In both sites a procedure of cluster sampling within multiple 
villages had been employed. The Vihiga sample was originally surveyed for an unrelated 
study in 1989, which serves as a baseline for the new study now nearing completion. The 
sample households in Embu were chosen because they were surveyed in 1998, also here 
for an unrelated study, but offering an opportunity to save time on creating a panel. This 
means there exists a large data set about the same households that complements the data 
collected specifically for this study. Data from the BASIS study that have been used in 
analyses presented here were collected in 2002, and they contain information about the 
                                                 
1 The concept of a tribe is rather politicized in Kenya, and sometimes disregards basic identifiers of 
ethnicity, such as language. Members of the Embu tribe speak a dialect of the Kikuyu language, but they 
insist they are not Kikuyus, while the Luhya tribe is rather a cluster of tribes speaking languages that are 
related but not mutually intelligible. Yet, they are referred to as one tribe. Thus, one may question what the 
term “tribe” means in this context. 
2 This study started as a socioeconomic study with funding from BASIS CRSP, but was later incorporated 
into an interdisciplinary study with additional funding from NSF. Social Networks and Technology Adoption    17 
households’ assets, including farm size and areas under various crops, as well as detailed 
input and output data for the farm operations, a household census, and data on access to 
credit and how households cope with adverse shocks. Moreover, these data include 
information about all the natural resource management techniques the sample households 
have adopted, (but as mentioned above, only if the household has adopted a practice, not 
how large proportion of the farm it is applied to).  
The data collected specifically for this study are a network data set, where the 
respondents (egos) were asked to identify the people they engage in borrowing and 
lending with (the “exchange” or “transfer” network), the people they like to discuss 
issues of farming with (the “communication” or “friends” network), and their 
geographically proximate neighbors. Then they were asked a set of questions about each 
of these network contacts (alters). The questionnaire uses a 12-month recall period. A 
subset of the sample was selected for a follow-up round (“snowballing”), where the alters 
identified in the first round were tracked down and interviewed, using the same 
questionnaire as in the first round. Within each household, the person who had the main 
responsibility for day-to-day farm management decisions was selected for interviews. 
This person was not necessarily the household head. In many households both spouses 
were farm managers, either working together, or having separate enterprises. Therefore, 
about one tenth of the sampled households were selected for interviews with both spouses, 
selected among those where both spouses were farm managers.  
The respondents were not asked all the same questions about themselves as about 
the network members, so the data about respondents and their network members do not 
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households that has been collected for the BASIS study does not include the network 
members. Data on technology adoption by network members is cruder than the data that 
is available for the BASIS respondents, and generally refers to aggregates of technologies, 
as described in the next section. 
For the subset that was used in the “snowballing” round, it is possible to apply 
network analysis techniques, such as calculation of various quantitative network 
measures developed by networks researchers. The network measure used here is known 
as Freeman Degrees, after Freeman (1978). For further details about how Freeman 
Degrees are calculated, one may consult Wasserman and Faust (1994). This is a measure 
that captures the level of social closure among first-order network links in egocentric 
networks.   
Variables used here to control for the correlated effects described by Manski 
include village dummies and the variable for having one of the three extension officers 
who appear most frequently in networks as a network member. Where too few degrees of 
freedom became a problem, a site variable substituted for the village dummies, 
distinguishing the two main districts from each other but not the villages. 
Summary of Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
This study suffers from the luxury of having too much data about the respondents. Using 
all interesting or relevant variables in the same regressions would generate results that 
would suffer from insufficient degrees of freedom and therefore poor power of testing. A 
procedure for data reduction has therefore been necessary. The main interest of this study 
is social network effects, but variables controlling for non-network effects were still Social Networks and Technology Adoption    19 
needed. Variables representing exogenous effects were substituted by index variables 
generated through the use of factor analysis, following the procedure used by Sahn and 
Stifel (2000) when they generated a welfare or wealth measure. Summary statistics for all 
variables that are not restricted to be equal to zero or one, or to be within the range from 
zero to one, are presented in Table 1. A table with summary statistics for all variables that 
have been used in regressions here would be too long for this publication. 
Regressions will not reveal all interesting interactions between variables unless 
interaction terms are included, which has been avoided in this study in order to limit the 
number of regressors. To make up for this deficiency, I will first discuss basic statistics 
for some of the variables, including some interactions, and provide background 
information about component parts of the study, before venturing into a discussion of 
regression results, which will follow in the next section. 
All of the technologies considered in this study are known and adopted by at least 
some respondents in both study sites, but there are villages where adoption or non-
adoption is universal for some of the technologies. Adoption rates of both terracing and 
drainage structures are higher in Vihiga than in Embu despite much steeper sloping 
farmland in the latter site. About 78% of the respondents in Vihiga have terraces, and 
24% have drainage structures, while in Embu these adoption rates are 58% and 17%, 
respectively. In 3 of the 11 villages used in the Vihiga sample, all respondents had 
terraced. In Vihiga mulching is also widely practiced (61% against 19% in Embu), but 
application of chemical fertilizers and tumbukiza are much more common in Embu (78% 
and 50%, respectively, compared to 52% and 6% in Vihiga). In 6 of the villages in 
Vihiga, nobody practiced tumbukiza. All of the tree technologies (tree crops, agroforestry Social Networks and Technology Adoption    20 
trees, windbreak) are more common in Embu, with adoption rates about 20-25% higher 
in Embu. 
The relationship between technologies - are they substitutes or complements? 
The clustering of technologies in this study is based on the assumption that technologies 
within clusters are complementary to each other, and will tend to be adopted together. 
And indeed, adoption is positively correlated for terracing and drainage structures 
(Pearson correlation coefficient 18%), and for the tree technologies (correlation 
coefficients around 33-34% except between tree crops and windbreak, where it is 
insignificant). But the soil nutrient management techniques do not follow this pattern. 
The only significant correlation between them is between mulching and tumbukiza, and 
this correlation is negative (-29%), reflecting their contrasting adoption rates in the two 
sites. But there is a positive correlation (19%) between mulching and drainage structures, 
suggesting that mulching may be chosen as much for its protection against soil erosion as 
for its organic fertilizer effects. 
Accuracy of information about network members 
Information about what practices alters have adopted are provided only by respondents 
unless alter is also a respondent. The accuracy of this information can be checked for 
alters who are themselves respondents by comparing the answers of ego with alter’s own 
answers. It happened occasionally that primary respondents chose other primary 
respondents as alters, but it is for the snowballing subset that data from interviews with 
alters as secondary respondents are available. A direct inspection of the data suggested 
that egos did not know what alters were practicing, and that the answers were no more Social Networks and Technology Adoption    21 
than guesses. Table 2 provides a simple check of the hypothesis that respondents are 
guessing, and that they base their guesses on a hunch about what overall adoption rate is. 
That means, if ego knows the adoption rate is α then she will guess alter is an adopter 
with frequency α. If respondents actually know who are adopters they should be able to 
answer correctly more often than they would if this hypothesis is right. If the hypothesis 
is right, respondents should guess correctly that alter is an adopter with expectancy α
2 and 
that alter is a non-adopter with expectancy (1-α)
2.  
In the aggregate this turned out to fit the data. This result is not reported here. But 
interesting patterns emerged when guesses were sorted by whether alter is a family 
member, whether ego is an adopter, and whether the two have discussed the technology 
in question. These results are reported in Table 2. The table reports percentage of guesses 
that correctly state alter is or is not an adopter, and percentage of guesses that incorrectly 
make the same statements. Then the actual adoption rate (α) for the sample is reported, 
the sum of correct guesses, and the expected sum if one were to guess freely, knowing α. 
The error is the difference between observed and expected rate of correct guesses under 
the hypothesis. In general, these errors suggest that respondents do somewhat poorer than 
they should under the hypothesis. But a closer inspection reveals biases in the answers.  
The guessing is about as expected when the data is sorted by whether alters are 
family members, with only two aggregate errors exceeding 5% (an arbitrary threshold 
chosen for error tolerance). Those are the figures for terracing and tumbukiza when alter 
is a family member. The answers are better than expected for tumbukiza (both negative 
and positive answers more often correct), but poorer than expected for terracing (vice 
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happening about this new and still uncommon practice, while they are not paying 
attention to the other, older technology.  When data are sorted by whether ego is an 
adopter, all but two aggregate errors exceed 5%. The answers are better than expected 
(both negative and positive answers more often correct) for non-adopters guessing about 
adoption of fallows, possibly just a coincidence. For non-adopters errors are otherwise 
driven by a negative bias - assuming a lower than correct adoption rate, while for 
adopters errors are driven by a positive bias - assuming a higher than correct adoption 
rate.  
When errors are positive, i.e., more correct answers than expected, the data 
generally do not support the assumption that respondents are better informed - errors are 
still driven by biases in their answers. Whether a bias will lead to a positive or negative 
error under the hypothesis depends on the magnitude and direction of the bias and the 
magnitude of the true α. For example, if α = 90%, then guessing “yes” 90% of the time 
will result in on average 81% correct “yes” and 1% correct “no”, while guessing “yes” 
100% of the time will result in 90% correct “yes” and 10% incorrect “yes” - a better 
result based on poorer information. 
The largest deviations from expectation under the hypothesis are found when data 
are sorted by whether people have discussed the technology. Again, all but two aggregate 
errors exceed 5%, but now nobody gets both positive and negative answers more often 
correct. All those who have not discussed the technology get aggregate errors exceeding 
5%, and in all cases it is due to a negative bias - assuming a lower than correct adoption 
rate. When those who have discussed the technology get large aggregate errors, it is 
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This simple analysis cannot determine whether people really are just guessing, but 
the hypothesis cannot be rejected either. It may appear like people in the aggregate guess 
as if they know the adoption rate, but not who the adopters are, but this masks systematic 
biases in the answers. These biases reflect the respondents’ own behavior and subjective 
impressions based on (presumably) superficial communication about actual adoption, and 
confirm findings made by other studies (Valente 2005).  
Weak ties 
To measure respondents’ ability to mobilize weak social ties to solve problems a 
specially designed experiment was conducted as a spin-off from this study, and two 
variables generated by it are included as regressors in the analyses that conclude this 
paper. In this experiment, respondents were given a set of questions they were not 
expected to be able to answer off the top of their heads, and then they were given three 
weeks to find the answers. We knew this information was available locally, as we had 
ourselves gathered it through mass media and selected local informants. To give 
respondents an incentive to put effort into the exercise, they were promised a cash reward 
for each correct answer. They were visited weekly, and rewards declined the longer time 
respondents needed to find the right answer.  
  The cash reward participants earned was a function of how many correct answers 
they found, and how quickly they found them, and this amount is one of the two variables 
later used in regressions to represent the ability to mobilize weak ties. The other variable 
is whether the respondent managed to answer correctly one of the questions that the 
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inputs and outputs traded at the district or national level. About 45% never found these 
prices, even with three weeks and the promise of a cash reward as an incentive. 
More than half of all correct answers produced were known to the respondents 
before being asked, or had been obtained from family members, but 20% of the correct 
answers were obtained by asking non-family members and 16% by contacting relevant 
institutions. To find the answer, respondents needed to travel to meet their informants in 
25% of the cases, and they used an intermediary to assist them in 38% of the cases. 
Telephones are almost non-existent among these respondents, and only very few answers 
(2%) had been obtained by calling someone. Mass media were also not used much. Only 
4% of correct answers had been obtained from radio, TV, or print media. Surprisingly, 
nobody discovered that tea and coffee prices obtained by local factories at auctions in 
Nairobi are announced weekly through newspapers. Those who found those answers had 
contacted the management of the local factory. In contrast, 76% managed to find 
currency exchange rates, and 19% of those who did, found the information in newspapers, 
so people are aware of newspapers as sources of some types of information. The exercise 
also included some questions about health recommendations promoted by the 
Government in campaigns that use radio and TV as important channels. About 85% of 
the participants got these answers right, although most of them had acquired the 
information from family and friends, not from media. But it means this information does 
reach rural villagers, a confirmation that the campaigns at least are successful in getting 
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A few were lucky and guessed one or two answers. After the three weeks were 
finished, respondents had succeeded in answering 83% of the questions correctly. There 
were 55 participants in this exercise. 
Groups 
Partnerships between government agencies and non-government organizations on one 
hand and community based organizations and local self-help groups on the other 
represent a cornerstone of Kenya’s development strategy. The government encourages 
self-help groups to get registered with a government office, in order to establish channels 
of information. These groups are often referred to as farmers’ groups, women’s groups, 
and youth groups, according to their membership base. To get registered, groups need to 
have by-laws and an elected board, hold annual elections, and write minutes from their 
meetings.  
Data about group membership was collected from the same 55 respondents who 
were participants in the weak ties experiment. These data are household and not 
respondent level data. This means that any household member may be the one who is 
member of a given group, not necessarily the respondent. In Vihiga there were no sample 
households (among the 23 sampled) who had members in either a farmers’ or a youth 
group, a farmer’s cooperative, or a savings and credit union (SACCO), while in Embu 
such groups were common. There, all households were active in a church and a farmers’ 
cooperative, and 27 out of 32 were members of a SACCO. But in both places there were 
many women’s groups, and a total of 60% of the sample households had active members 
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Results 
As noted above, a data reduction procedure using factor analysis has been applied to 
reduce the number of variables used in regressions. Results of this factor analysis are not 
included here, but can be made available upon request. For what I refer to as exogenous 
factors here, following Manski, four factors were retained, representing 20 original 
variables. These variables include the farmer’s gender, age, education level, a wealth 
proxy, farm assets, and access to formal finance, etc. An interpretation of the resulting 
factors is outside the topic of this paper, and will not be attempted. But their presence in 
the regressions hopefully controls for the exogenous factors.  
The results of regressions are presented in tables 3 to 5 and 7 to 9. The first 3 
tables present results of Probit estimations of adoption on correlated, exogenous and 
endogenous factors using the whole sample of respondents, while the final 3 present 
Probit estimations of adoption that bring exogenous and endogenous factors together with 
data on groups and weak ties to summarize it all. These final regressions are based on a 
subset of only 55 respondents for whom these additional data were collected. Each table 
presents one cluster of choice variables, where the clusters are “soil and water 
conservation techniques” (terraces and drainage structures), “soil nutrient management 
techniques” (inorganic fertilizers, mulching and tumbukiza), and “trees on farms” (tree 
crops, agroforestry treees and windbreaks).  
Other candidate technologies were included in the data, but had to be discarded 
for this analysis because of lack of variation, either due to near universal adoption or near 
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developed and promoted by the World Agroforestry Center (WAC, formerly the 
International Center for Research on Agroforestry, ICRAF), a collaborator with this 
research project. Multivariate regressions for each cluster of selected technologies were 
attempted, but produced no significant results. Despite the data reduction procedure 
employed, regressions still suffered from too few degrees of freedom to allow such 
demanding estimations. 
Testing H1 
The first hypothesis is about the effect of informal credit and insurance on adoption. The 
relevant variables are network transfers variables, two variables representing access to 
cash, “Household receives remittances” and “Number of ROSCA memberships”, and one 
variable representing how well informal insurance works for the household, “Not 
recovered from earlier shock”. The network transfers variables are based on questions of 
the form: “How many times the last 12 months did you receive/provide ... from/to this 
person”, referring to a named network contact. The questions identify three types of 
transfers, i.e., cash transfers, transfers in kind, and the exchange of unpaid labor. The 
variables used here are aggregates across network members per respondent. Amounts of 
transfers are not considered. Only the largest amount transacted each way within each 
dyad has been recorded, so aggregate amounts cannot be calculated. The recorded 
transfers include both borrowing and lending and the exchange of gifts that are not 
expected to be repaid. A deeper analysis of these network transfers as well as ROSCA 
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Of course, whenever a technology was adopted more than a year ago, these 
transactions took place after adoption, and cannot be taken as causing them. But the 
assumption is that the activity level within transfer networks is a function of relatively 
stable characteristics of respondents, which were present also at the time when the 
adoption decision was made. However, when interpreting the results, one needs to 
consider the possibility that adoption itself may have interacted with a respondent’s 
characteristics to change transfer patterns within the network.  
Households that receive remittances have family members living outside the 
household who have good jobs and are able to send money home, providing a relatively 
reliable source of cash. ROSCA membership enables households to save cash for 
somewhat larger purchases, and can sometimes serve as a source of informal insurance. 
The poorest have difficulties meeting the requirements for ROSCA membership, and 
choose not to participate, or are excluded, while some who are better off are able to hold 
multiple ROSCA memberships. The households who had “Not recovered from earlier 
shock” had experienced a serious shock, like a major loss of livestock or crops or the 
death of a household member, during the last five years, and had not recovered socio-
economically from this shock by the time of data collection. The inability to recover from 
a shock is here taken as an indicator of insufficient informal insurance. 
For adoption of terraces the only one of these variables that has a significant 
coefficient estimate is the number of times respondent has provided cash transfers, and it 
is weak and negative. It means that those who are most active on the giving/lending side 
for cash transfers are slightly less likely to be adopters of terracing. But if they are able to 
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obviously, the absence of adoption is not driven by a cash constraint, nor has the absence 
of adoption caused a cash constraint. For adoption of drainage structures, the coefficient 
estimate on ROSCA memberships is significant and negative, suggesting the same 
reasoning as with terraces. But the relationships between ROSCA memberships, 
participation in cash transfers through networks, and wealth, are weak. It is those of 
intermediate wealth who participate in ROSCAs and network transfers, and neither the 
poorest nor the wealthiest (Hogset 2005). A positive effect of being a recipient of cash 
transfers on adoption of drainage structures is too weak to matter. 
For adoption of inorganic fertilizers and mulching, there are no significant 
coefficient estimates among these variables. But the coefficient estimate on receiving 
remittances is strong and significant for adoption of tumbukiza. This is a weak support for 
H1, although remittances do not originate from what is normally termed “social 
networks”. There is also a positive relationship between adoption of tumbukiza and being 
a provider of transfers in kind, but the effect is weak, and cannot be interpreted as a direct 
support for H1. 
For the “trees” technologies there are many transfers variables that are significant, 
but none has a magnitude that matters. For most respondents the number of transfers 
ranges from zero to maybe 20 for each of these variables. One might want to consider 
what difference 10 more transactions make, instead of 1 more, but still the effect is too 
small to matter. Moreover, the signs do not conform to the hypothesis. Receiving 
remittances has a positive coefficient estimate, which does conform to the hypothesis. 
Remittances may be a good source of cash for investments in tree crops. However, 
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positive coefficient estimate for both tree crops and agroforestry trees, contrary to 
expectation. 
Thus, the conclusion for the variables that are relevant for H1 is that the 
hypothesis is rejected. While having access to informal credit and insurance through 
social networks surely does not hurt technology adoption, it appears to be unimportant. 
Testing H2 
This hypothesis relates conservative behavior to the economic dependence on networks 
of a net borrower. Following the rejection of H1, I would expect a rejection of this 
hypothesis, too, as they are related and may be viewed as nested. H2 implies not 
necessarily that “conservative” farmers never adopt, only that they become adoption 
laggards, i.e., all else being equal, they adopted a lower number of years ago than alters, 
if they have adopted at all. 
Some information is available about how long ago respondents adopted some 
natural resource management practices. Except for tumbukiza, these practices do not 
correspond directly to the practices included in the analysis here, but rather to aggregates 
of technologies. They are “terracing” (i.e., soil and water conservation measures, 
including grass strips, bunds, ridges, etc.), fallowing (incl. improved fallows), organic 
fertilizers, incl. mulching, green manuring, and tumbukiza. For all of the practices except 
tumbukiza, there is a positive and relatively strong correlation (19-42%) between 
respondent’s age and how long ago the practice was adopted. This suggests that the 
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adoption probably follows roughly the sequence by which the respondents became 
farmers.  
But that is not the case for tumbukiza, which is a newer practice that is not as 
widely adopted as the others. The results of a count regression (using the Poisson 
distribution) of years since adoption on respondent’s age, endogenous factors, and the 
predictor from a Probit regression of adoption on exogenous factors are presented in 
Table 6. Here we find that the strongest predictors for how long ago a farmer adopted are 
exogenous and correlated factors, and to some extent social learning. Those with many 
neighbors and friends who practice tumbukiza (according to the respondents’ guesses) 
have adopted earlier, while those who know tumbukiza as something preachers and civil 
servants practice are later adopters. But recall from the previous section how biased the 
information about alters’ adoption choices is. Those who are themselves adopters of 
tumbukiza have grossly overestimated the overall adoption rate in their guessing about 
the behavior of their network contacts. Thus, even the learning effect is not very reliable. 
The results for network transfer variables in the adoption regressions in tables 3 to 
5 can also serve as support for H2. But as noted above, coefficient estimates on these 
variables are rarely significant, and even if they are, their magnitudes are too low to 
matter. Moreover, the hypotheses to not relate being a provider of transfers to adoption, 
and many of the few significant coefficient estimates are indeed on variables for 
providing transfers. Participation in informal transfers through networks has negligible 
effects on how early someone became an adopter of tumbukiza. The conclusion is that the 
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Discussion of H1 and H2 against each other 
It is possible that these weak results for both hypotheses are a result of effects that cancel 
each other. Under H1, more transfers received lead to more adoption, while under H2 it 
leads to later, or less, adoption. The hypotheses make assumptions only about transfers 
received, not provided, but providers ought to be more resourceful than recipients, and 
thus not be among the disadvantaged ones. So providers of transfers should never be 
adoption laggards. Moreover, these effects should depend on features of the technologies, 
such as how capital intensive or risky they are. H1 should be expected to dominate for 
capital intensive technologies, H2 for risky technologies. But the patterns found in the 
regressions discussed here do not conform to either of the hypotheses, so neither is 
supported by the data. 
Testing H3 
This hypothesis states that the more adopters a farmer knows and interacts with through 
social networks, the more likely that farmer is to also adopt the new technology. There 
are two categories of variables here. All respondents have listed family members, 
neighbors and “friends” as network members. In this context, “friends” are people the 
respondent “likes to discuss issues of farming with”. A fourth category everybody has 
reported, is those they “engage in borrowing and lending with”, i.e., the transfers network. 
For these categories, variables have been generated that represent the proportion or 
fraction of members who (according to the respondent) are adopters. In addition, some 
few network members are persons of some significance in the community, such as school 
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variables have been generated that represent the number of such persons a respondent has 
named as network members who are also adopters. These are count variables, not 
proportions. Also note that the technologies they represent, are the aggregates identified 
in the discussion of H2. These are included in the regressions presented in Tables 3 
through 5.  
  In the regressions, the adoption choices of network members were included for 
technology clusters that the ones in question were thought to belong to. Thus, in the soil 
and water conservation regressions, network members’ adoption variables for “terracing” 
are included. In the soil fertility management regressions, the adoption variables for 
“organic fertilizers” are included. And finally, for the trees regressions, the adoption 
variables for both of those aggregates are included, as trees are thought to address both 
soil conservation and soil fertility problems. 
For the soil and water conservation technologies, the significant coefficient 
estimates on these variables are mostly negative (there are 6 significant, negative 
coefficients). The only exceptions are the positive estimates on the variables for the 
proportion of neighbors and “friends” who have adopted “terracing” in the terraces 
regression, but a positive relationship between terraces on own farm and neighbors’ 
farms may be attributed as much to correlated factors (same topography) as to social 
learning. 
For the soil nutrient management technologies there are very few significant 
coefficient estimates. For inorganic fertilizers there are no significant coefficient 
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there are two significant estimates, both positive. The coefficient estimate on the number 
of civil servants who are network members and who have terraces is positive in all 3 tree 
regressions, while the estimate on the number of civil servants who use organic fertilizers 
is negative in two of the three regressions, for agroforestry trees and windbreak. Except 
for these results, there are only few significant coefficient estimates for trees (5 out of 42 
possible), one negative and 4 positive. 
The results may suggest that persons of some significance in the community, such 
as civil servants, who are the highest earners and often better educated than the average 
villager, do influence people’s behavior, but the inconsistent signs on the coefficient 
estimates in question make the results hard to interpret. The lack of direct correspondence 
between the technologies on either side of the equality sign is a source of noise, and may 
contribute to weak results, but given the positive bias in reporting the alters’ adoption 
choices, the sparsity of positive coefficient estimates is quite conspicuous. It does not 
look like the data support H3, at least not strongly. The existence of persons with 
influence on the behavior of network contacts cannot be rejected completely. But the 
relationship between overall adoption rates and adoption appears to be weak. 
Testing H4 
There are 4 variables representing exposure to the extension service in the regressions. 
One is a variable representing the number of extension officers, vets or representatives of 
agricultural cooperatives who are members of the respondents’ networks. The other 3 are 
binary variables representing whether specific extension officers were listed as network 
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the sample households in Embu are located. In Vihiga respondents had much less contact 
with the extension service, and there were no such designated extension officers in the 
area. 
There is only one significant coefficient estimate on the number of extension 
officers, and that one is positive. That is the case for windbreaks. Most of the coefficient 
estimates on the specific extension officers are not significant, and of the 4 exceptions 
two are positive and two are negative. Apparently, the extension officer in Manyatta has a 
positive effect on the adoption of terraces, while the same extension officer has a 
negative effect on the adoption of agroforestry trees. These coefficients counterbalance 
the coefficients on the binary variables representing Manyatta, which for both 
technologies have the opposite sign. That means the coefficient estimate on the extension 
officer is positive when it is negative for the district, and vice versa. The same pattern is 
found for the extension officer in Mukangu and windbreaks. In Mukangu the adoption 
rate of windbreaks is higher than the control group, but less so for those who list the 
extension officer as a network contact. But in the regression for agroforestry trees, the 
coefficient estimates are positive for both the extension officer for Kianjuki and Kavutiri 
and for both of the corresponding village dummies, suggesting that agroforestry trees has 
been a priority of the extension service in these villages, with the particular extension 
officer playing an important role. 
A positive effect from exposure to the extension service is both possible and 
likely, but it is not clear whether the extension service is concertedly promoting the 
technologies under study here. Rather, it looks like the extension officers have their 
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the hypothesis, only modify it a little. When the extension service is promoting a practice, 
then contact between farmers and extension officers apparently does have a positive 
effect on adoption. Thus, H4 is not rejected. 
Testing H5 
Data on weak ties were only collected for a small subset of respondents. They were used 
in the final regressions that are presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9. Here the number of 
variables has been cut down to the barest minimum to compensate for the low number of 
observations, only 45-49 after loss of observations due to missing variables. Most of the 
variables used here are index variables generated by means of factor analysis, and 
substitute for the ones that were used to generate them. As for the generated variables 
representing exogenous factors in the regressions already discussed, the results of factor 
analysis for the variables in question here are not reported, but can be made available 
upon request. Due to the low number of observations, regressions did not run well, and 
some playing around with different levels of aggregation of variables was employed to 
select models that generated results that could be interpreted. But due to the low number 
of observations involved, the results are not robust, and should not be given too much 
weight. 
The variable representing success with finding the answer to the most difficult 
question (a regional farm input price) is not significant in any of the regressions. The 
coefficient on the weak ties score, i.e., the cash reward earned, is weakly significant in 
two regressions, and it is negative in both cases, contrary to expectation under the 
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standard deviation 105 Shillings. Thus the strongest effect, the one for inorganic 
fertilizers, represents a difference of 1.68 per standard deviation, which is not entirely 
negligible. This may represent a real relationship, but it may also be just a spurious 
correlation. Given the low number of observations and the low power of these tests, it is 
tempting to reject the regressions as inconclusive. Better data is needed to reach a 
conclusion about the hypothesis. Thus, H5 remains unresolved. 
Testing H6 and H7 
For this study, data about conflicts over technological externalities were collected to 
serve as proxies for the presence of such effects. But conflicts arise when negative 
externalities are present, not where there are positive externalities. Thus, this information 
does not capture the effects of positive externalities. The most frequently occurring 
conflicts between neighbors reported by the respondents are due to straying animals that 
cause damage, something 66% of respondents have experienced. But natural resource 
management techniques or their absence also generate conflicts, as 25% report having 
experienced conflicts over water run-off causing soil erosion, while 48% report having 
experienced conflicts due to detrimental effects of trees at or near boundaries. But 
although according to the extension service in Embu, acidification of soil due to run-off 
of chemical fertilizers from land planted in tea is known to be a problem there, only 15% 
of the respondents reported any experience with conflicts over fertilizer run-offs.  
Conflicts over trees appear to be the ones that are most difficult to solve. Two-
thirds (66%) of all respondents who had experienced such conflicts reported that they had 
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conflicts had been solved, the involved parties had usually solved it themselves through 
direct negotiations (82%), but in many cases a village chief or elder had been asked to 
mediate (16%).  
Three questions about conflicts with neighbors are used here as regressors. They 
represent conflicts over water run-off causing soil erosion, fertilizer run-off causing 
pollution, and conflicts over trees at or near boundaries. Interaction terms between these 
variables and farm size are also used. Interaction terms between conflicts and the 
neighbors’ adoption choices were tested, but did not generate any significant coefficients, 
so they were dropped. The problem here might be that the information available about the 
neighbors’ adoption choices is both too imprecise (not specific enough about what 
technologies it refers to), and too noisy (respondents were only guessing about what 
neighbors do). 
These variables have generated some significant coefficient estimates that are 
large enough to matter. Having experienced conflicts apparently leads to less adoption of 
drainage structures, and the coefficient estimate on conflicts is right on the edge of 
becoming significant for inorganic fertilizers as well. If a site variable (Vihiga/Embu) 
replaces the village variables in this regression, it becomes significant at the 5% level, 
taking the value  -1.184.  
For drainage structures conflicts can go both ways. If constructed well, they can 
be a solution to conflicts over water run-off, but if constructed poorly, they can make 
matters worse. Getting it right might be a problem the extension service can assist with. 
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avoid conflicts they may lead to with neighbors. Conflicts over fertilizer run-offs are only 
relevant to inorganic fertilizers, and their effect is as expected under the hypothesis. 
Having experienced conflicts also leads to less adoption of agroforestry trees and 
windbreaks, and more so the larger the farm. Windbreaks and agroforestry trees are often 
planted on boundaries, and may therefore be at the center of many conflicts over trees at 
or near boundaries. Thus, it is not surprising that conflicts over trees lead to less adoption 
of these two technologies. What is surprising is that the effect is stronger the larger the 
farm is. This is contrary to expectation. While a diminishing effect with larger farm sizes 
is not explicitly included in the hypothesis, it would make sense. Those who have larger 
farms have more freedom to plant trees at some distance from boundaries, whereby 
conflicts can be avoided.  
In general, it looks like H6 and H7 are supported by the data, so these hypotheses 
are not rejected.  
Social capital 
The variable “Household head has always lived here” represents having a long history of 
continuous networking in the same environment, which one would expect increases the 
probability that an individual is well connected, an important component of “social 
capital”. Here, it is thought of as representing unmeasured social capital, complementing 
the groups and networks data collected for this study. 
The coefficient estimate on “Household head has always lived here” is positive 
and strong for drainage structures, mulching and agroforestry trees. For drainage 
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these technologies may be hampered by negative externalities leading to conflicts. The 
better connected may be in a better position to solve conflicts through mobilizing key 
contacts, or by initiating collective action. But an explanation for why households whose 
household head has always lived in the same place are more likely to practice mulching 
can only be purely speculative. 
Groups 
The group variables are only available for the small subset, and because of the small 
sample, the results of these regressions need to be taken with a grain of salt. The results 
of these regressions are found in Tables 7, 8 and 9. For the soil fertility management 
regressions and 2 of the 3 trees technologies regressions there are no significant 
coefficient estimates, except for a composite group membership index, derived through 
factor analysis using group membership variables, which is significant and positive for 
adoption of tumbukiza. In contrast, all the group membership variables are significant in 
the regression for adoption of windbreaks. Here, membership in a youth group is positive, 
while all the others are negative. For soil and water conservation techniques, membership 
in a youth group has a positive effect on adoption of terraces, while there are two 
significant coefficient estimates that are negative, one on membership in a village 
development committee for adoption of terraces, and the other on membership in a 
women’s group for adoption of drainage structures. 
Summary of All Factors 
The final regressions in tables 7 to 9 represent a summary of all factors, (except 
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so the correlated factors should be basically the same, at least within site). In 6 out of 8 
regressions at least one of the index variables representing exogenous factors is 
significant. In 3 of the regressions, the conflicts variable is significant, and it is negative 
in all cases.  
The variable for network transfers, an index variable generated by factor analysis 
on Freeman Degrees for participation in network transfers, is significant and strong in the 
regression for terraces. Because of the aggregate nature of the variable, it is impossible to 
disentangle, e.g., enabling due to transfers received from a wealth effect that leads to 
more transfers provided, so interpretation of this variable is difficult. The variables for 
network influence - whether network contacts are adopters - are not significant in any of 
the regressions for soil and water conservation technologies. But in the regression for 
mulching, the Freeman Degrees for adoption of tumbukiza is included, mainly because in 
its presence, the best model fit was achieved, and the coefficient on it is significant and 
negative. This is basically a spurious result, due to the concentration of tumbukiza in 
Embu, and of mulching in Vihiga. The difference including it made reveals the 
difficulties I had with making these regressions run, due to the low number of 
observations and large number of variables. For agroforestry trees and windbreak, 
Freeman Degrees for adoption of terracing are significant, and in both regressions the 
coefficient estimates are positive. This suggests a positive relationship between soil and 
water conservation measures and the planting of trees for various purposes. 
In 5 of the 8 regressions, the coefficient estimates on contact with extension 
officers are significant, and 3 of the significant estimates are negative, for drainage 
structures, inorganic fertilizers and agroforestry trees. Note that the included villages here Social Networks and Technology Adoption    42 
are Manyatta and Kitulu. Contact with the extension service is much better in Manyatta 
(Embu) than in Kitulu (Vihiga), so these coefficients can be interpreted as a spurious 
relationship between site, extension service, and technologies. Drainage structures are 
much more common in Vihiga. In Manyatta the adoption rate for agroforestry trees is 
high, but within the village it is lower for those who have contact with the local extension 
officer, as revealed in table 5. The result for inorganic fertilizers in the summary 
regressions cannot be explained by appealing to the main regressions. 
The summary regressions cannot determine what category of factors is most or 
least important for technology adoption. They appear to all be important, but not equally 
so for all technologies. Given the very low number of observations used in these 
regressions, these results need to be taken with a grain of salt, but they do suggest that 
group membership may be important, and that individual adoption behavior reflects the 
priorities of these groups.   
Summary and Conclusions 
Two hypotheses regarding the relationship between informal finance through social 
networks and technology adoption have been discussed here, one termed the “enabling 
model”, the other the “power model”. According to the former, a person is more likely to 
adopt the better access she has to informal finance through social networks, because it 
enables her to finance investments in technology adoption. This effect should be more 
pronounced the more capital intensive a technology is. The latter implies that a person 
will be more hesitant to adopt the more dependent she is on network transfers, so that Social Networks and Technology Adoption    43 
more transfers received leads to more conservative behavior, and later adoption. This 
should be more pronounced the riskier adoption of the technology is. 
Neither of these effects could be detected in the data. Coefficient estimates were 
either insignificant or were of too low magnitude to matter. Moreover, signs on the few 
significant estimates were inconsistent with the hypotheses. But being a recipient of 
remittances has a positive effect on the probability of being an adopter of several 
technologies considered here, consistent with the hypothesis that access to cash facilitates 
technology adoption. But network transfers do not appear to be important contributions to 
investments in new technologies. If such effects had been found, one might have wanted 
to avoid crowding out network transfers with interventions intended to improve access to 
finance for the purpose of technology adoption. The results presented here suggest such a 
concern is unwarranted. However, social networks may be important as a source of 
informal insurance, so policies aimed at improving social security need to take into 
consideration their effect on social networks and transfers within them. 
This study finds that direct contact with the extension service has a strong effect 
on technology adoption in some cases. Of course, it matters whether the technology 
under consideration is being actively promoted by the local extension officers. But where 
this service is established, it is well worth including in future policies aimed at improving 
agricultural productivity. 
Technological spill-over effects, or externalities, were found to have strong 
effects on adoption, and interestingly, adoption of agroforestry, a technology promoted as 
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management and prevent soil degradation, appears to suffer negative consequences of 
conflicts between neighbors over boundary trees. Agroforestry trees are typically planted 
on boundaries. Here, the extension service may play an important role with teaching 
farmers how to reap the benefits of agroforestry without generating the negative 
externalities associated with it. This can be achieved through, e.g., pruning of trees both 
above and below ground, techniques that have been promoted by Kenya Forestry 
Research Institute, KEFRI. These techniques require skills that the extension service can 
help farmers acquire. 
An experiment designed to measure rural villagers’ ability to access information 
by means of weak social ties has been discussed here. A high ability according to this 
experiment has not been shown to be important for adoption of the technologies 
considered in this paper. But more interesting is the direct findings about how people 
access information. In general, rural villagers appear to have poor access to information 
that is disseminated through mass media, in particular printed media. The sample 
respondents lived in coffee and tea districts, but even with three weeks to work on it, and 
the promise of a cash reward if they found the answer, they were not able to find out the 
prices the local tea and coffee factories had achieved at recent auctions in Nairobi, 
although these prices are announced weekly in national newspapers. However, 
information about health issues that is being disseminated through radio and TV was 
well-known. Most respondents got this information from family or friends if they did not 
have a radio or TV themselves. This means dissemination of information to farmers is not 
effective if print media are chosen as a main channel. But penetration of radio and TV 
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Finally, this study has found that local groups, such as women’s groups and youth 
groups, probably are important instruments for dissemination of information and social 
learning, although the data the analysis is based on here come from a sample that is too 
small to be representative. Such groups are an important component of the development 
strategy adopted by Kenya’s government, and the findings of this study suggest that 
groups should continue to be a component of this strategy packet. Social Networks and Technology Adoption    46 
Table 1. Summary statistics of variables that are not restricted to equal zero or one or be within the range 
from zero to one. 
 
Label N  Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Respondent's  age  230 51.90 15.44  14  88 
Number of ROSCA memberships  241  0.79  1.00  0  5 
Density of respondent's network  241  9.90  3.45  3  18 
Highest education level in household  238  2.79  0.86  1  5 
Area under cultivation in acres  237  1.96  2.06  0.2  15 
Household labor days per month  235  40.70  25.59  0  140 
Slope of steepest plot (%)  226  26.22  21.47  0  100 
Mean slope (%)  226  13.12  10.63  0  70 
Number of extension officers in network  240  0.48  0.83  0  5 
Number of teachers who have terraces etc.  240  0.39  0.74  0  4 
Number of teachers who use organic fertilizers  240  0.41  0.74  0  4 
Number of preachers who have terraces etc.  240  0.10  0.34  0  2 
Number of preachers who use organic fertilizers  240  0.13  0.41  0  3 
Number of civil servants who have terraces etc.  240  0.44  0.84  0  5 
Number of civil servants who use organic fertilizers  240  0.49  0.86  0  5 
Number of business owners who have terraces etc.  240  0.79  1.09  0  5 
Number of business owners who use organic fertilizers  240  0.86  1.12  0  6 
Aggregate number of times receiving cash  240  6.93  10.06  0  93 
Aggregate number of times providing cash  240  5.47  7.90  0  82 
Aggregate number of times receiving in kind  240  15.05  23.17  0  256 
Aggregate number of times providing in kind  240  16.89  36.22  0  500 
Aggregate number of times receiving labor  240  5.75  12.36  0  110 
Aggregate number of times providing labor  240  6.22  20.25  0  270 
Freeman Degrees for discussing terracing  327  2.68  2.06  0  15.72 
Freeman Degrees of adopting terracing  327  2.81  2.03  0  12.23 
Freeman Degrees for discussing organic fertilizers  327  2.79  2.08  0  16.16 
Freeman Degrees for adopting organic fertilizers  327  3.00  2.16  0  14.41 
Fr. Deg. for frequency of cash transfers received  327  6.06  11.19  0  93 
Fr. Deg. for amounts of cash transfers received  327  1231.62  4906.69  0  66000 
Fr. Deg. for frequency of cash transfers provided  327  5.84  9.78  0  68 
Fr. Deg. for amounts of cash transfers provided  327  1013.12  4492.99  0  66200 
Fr. Deg. for frequency of transfers in kind received  327  31.33  56.03  0  437 
Fr. Deg. for value of transfers in kind received  327  477.90  1287.55  0  19500 
Fr. Deg. for frequency of transfers in kind provided  327  31.94  70.69  0  775 
Fr. Deg. for value of transfers in kind provided  327  629.43  2024.98  0  24000 
Fr. Deg. for labor days received  327  18.14  43.20  0  319 
Fr. Deg. for labor days provided  327  13.02  28.07  0  200 
Freeman Degrees Index for network transfers   228  0.00  0.92  -0.97  9.02 
Interaction Farm Size x Conflicts (water run-off)  228  0.37  0.91  0  6 
Interaction Farm Size x Conflicts (fertilizer run-off)  229  0.17  0.61  0  6 
Interaction Farm Size x Conflicts (boundary trees)  229  0.81  1.43  0  8 Social Networks and Technology Adoption    47 
Table2. Checking correspondence between respondents’ answers about the adoption choices of alters, and 
alters’ own answers. α is the adoption rate among alters.(%) 
 
 Terracing  Fallows  Organic  Fertilizers  Tumbukiza 
              
Family  No Yes No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes 
Correct  negative  2.93  0.37 54.15  51.66  0.65  0.37 53.85 57.25 
Correct  positive  73.97  77.78 9.52 10.70  89.02  89.59 9.62 9.54 
False  negative  13.45 14.81 17.72  14.39  6.74  7.81 18.33 17.56 
False  positive  9.65  7.04 18.60  23.25  3.59  2.23 18.21 15.65 
Observed α  87.42 92.59 27.24  25.09  95.76  97.40 27.95 27.10 
(1-α)  squared  1.58  0.55 52.94  56.12  0.18  0.07 51.91 53.14 
α-squared  76.42  85.73 7.42  6.30  91.70  94.87 7.81 7.34 
Obs.  Sum  76.90 78.15 63.67  62.36  89.67  89.96 63.47 66.79 
Exp.  Sum  78.01 86.28 60.36  62.41  91.88  94.94 59.72 60.49 
Error  -1.11  -8.13 3.31 -0.05  -2.21  -4.98 3.75 6.30 
Observations  922 270 903  271  920  269 884 262 
              
Adopter  No Yes No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes 
Correct  negative  6.42  1.95 58.26  41.56  0.00  0.63 66.34 23.82 
Correct  positive  57.80  76.44 9.26 10.94  89.09  89.11 4.96  21.63 
False  negative  26.61 12.52 18.87  11.56  9.09  6.93 19.49 15.05 
False  positive  9.17 9.09  13.60 35.94  1.82  3.33 9.20  39.50 
Observed α  84.41 88.96 28.13  22.50  98.18  96.04 24.45 36.68 
(1-α)  squared  2.43  1.22 51.65  60.06  0.03  0.16 57.08 40.09 
α-squared  71.25  79.14 7.91  5.06  96.39  92.24 5.98  13.45 
Obs.  Sum  64.22 78.39 67.52  52.50  89.09  89.74 71.30 45.45 
Exp.  Sum  73.68 80.36 59.57  65.13  96.43  92.39 63.06 53.55 
Error  -9.46  -1.97 7.95  -12.63  -7.34  -2.65 8.24  -8.10 
Observations  109  1078 853  320  55  1111 826 319 
            
Discuss  No Yes No Yes  No  Yes  No Yes 
Correct  negative  7.59  1.05 64.99  34.47  1.57  0.40 69.34 22.44 
Correct  positive  48.95  81.26 5.43 17.12  67.54  93.29 2.80  24.38 
False  negative  36.29  8.17 20.76  10.50  27.75  3.01 22.77  8.31 
False  positive  7.17 9.53 8.82 37.90  3.14  3.31 5.09  44.88 
Observed α  85.24 89.43 26.19  27.62  95.29  96.30 25.57 32.69 
(1-α)  squared  2.18  1.12 54.48  52.39  0.22  0.14 55.40 45.31 
α-squared  72.66  79.98 6.86  7.63  90.80  92.74 6.54  10.69 
Obs.  Sum  56.54 82.31 70.42  51.59  69.11  93.69 72.14 46.82 
Exp.  Sum  74.84 81.09 61.34  60.02  91.02  92.87 61.94 55.99 
Error  -18.30 1.22 9.08 -8.43  -21.91  0.82  10.20  -9.17 
Observations  237 955 737  438  191  998 786 361 
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Table 3. Adoption of soil and water conservation techniques. Probit estimations. 
 
 Terraces  Drainage 
structures 
Extension officer Manyatta  2.008  0.159 
 (0.897)**  (0.875) 
Extension officer Kianjuki and Kavutiri  0.602  0.813 
 (0.580)  (0.692) 
Extension officer Mukangu  0.165  1.824 
 (0.809)  (1.129) 
Manyatta -1.621  1.635 
 (0.854)*  (1.117) 
Kianjuki -1.817  1.715 
 (0.823)**  (1.108) 
Kavutiri -1.778  1.213 
 (0.859)**  (1.137) 
Mukangu -2.965  1.241 
 (0.934)***  (1.216) 
Ikuyu   1.004 
   (1.333) 
Ivona -0.968  1.937 
 (1.051)  (1.313) 
Indulo   1.359 
   (1.142) 
Kedeta -1.134  0.955 
 (0.672)*  (0.981) 
Kitulu -0.868  1.252 
 (0.531)  (0.870) 
Kisienya -0.415  2.236 
 (0.704)  (0.970)** 
Luvuka -0.764  -0.177 
 (0.644)  (0.994) 
Madzuu   1.001 
   (1.023) 
Vigina 0.381  -0.296 
 (0.746)  (1.003) 
Exogenous factors 1  0.435  -1.132 
 (0.287)  (0.348)*** 
Exogenous factors 2  0.288  -0.252 
 (0.165)*  (0.185) 
Exogenous factors 3  -0.069  -0.082 
 (0.177)  (0.223) 
Exogenous factors 4  -0.392  -0.195 
 (0.189)**  (0.199) 
0.003 0.024  Aggregate number of times receiving cash 
(0.014) (0.013)* 
-0.069 0.005  Aggregate number of times providing cash 
(0.025)*** (0.027) Social Networks and Technology Adoption    49 
 Terraces  Drainage 
-0.019 0.002  Aggregate number of times receiving in kind 
(0.014) (0.017) 
0.004 -0.008  Aggregate number of times providing in kind 
(0.008) (0.014) 
0.035 -0.007  Aggregate number of times receiving labor 
(0.025) (0.020) 
-0.008 0.014  Aggregate number of times providing labor 
(0.010) (0.021) 
HH receives remittances  0.277  -0.117 
 (0.322)  (0.349) 
0.161 -0.366  Number of ROSCA memberships 
(0.157) (0.181)** 
-0.100 -0.276  Not recovered from earlier shock 
(0.321) (0.331) 
-0.407 0.915  HH head has always lived here 
(0.374) (0.446)** 
0.249 -0.213  Number of extension officers in network 
(0.220) (0.314) 
-0.649 -0.390  Prop. of family members who have terraces etc. 
(0.347)* (0.368) 
-2.268 0.161  Prop. of transfer network who have terraces etc. 
(0.850)*** (0.787) 
1.136 -1.293  Prop. of neighbors who have terraces etc. 
(0.646)* (0.669)* 
1.159 0.683  Prop of friends who have terraces etc. 
(0.509)** (0.572) 
-0.121 0.106  Number of teachers who have terraces etc. 
(0.190) (0.249) 
0.805 -0.092  Number of preachers who have terraces etc. 
(0.533) (0.450) 
-0.291 0.029  Number of civil servants who have terraces etc. 
(0.166)* (0.188) 
-0.343 0.130  Number of business owners who have terraces etc. 
(0.143)** (0.171) 
0.277 -1.111  Has experienced conflicts over water run-off 
(0.495) (0.641)* 
0.215 0.222  Interaction between farm size and conflicts 
(0.225) (0.266) 
Constant 2.628  -1.915 
 (0.790)***  (1.070)* 
Observations 186  186 
Pseudo R
2 0.3746  0.3479 
P-value 0.0000  0.0072 
Log likelihood  -73  -62 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Extension officer Manyatta  -0.590  0.259  0.017 
 (0.778)  (0.735)  (0.793) 
Extension officer Kianjuki and Kavutiri  0.169  -0.432  -0.048 
 (0.614)  (0.627)  (0.694) 
Extension officer Mukangu  1.348  0.742  -0.200 
 (0.941)  (0.993)  (0.939) 
Manyatta   -2.187  1.767 
   (1.231)*  (1.220) 
Kianjuki -0.539  -2.322  2.819 
 (0.747)  (1.244)*  (1.198)** 
Kavutiri -0.640  -2.021  2.861 
 (0.795)  (1.266)  (1.224)** 
Mukangu -1.304  -2.741  3.250 
 (0.779)*  (1.282)**  (1.230)*** 
Ivona -0.905  -1.245  1.908 
 (1.264)  (1.443)  (1.745) 
Isiagalo -1.454  0.642   
 (0.978)  (1.225)   
Indulo -0.554  0.920   
 (0.972)  (1.312)   
Kedeta -2.343  -0.315  1.414 
 (0.794)***  (1.002)  (0.962) 
Kitulu -0.942  -0.057   
 (0.757)  (0.978)   
Kisienya -1.078  0.258   
 (0.770)  (1.111)   
Luvuka -2.246  -0.184   
 (0.811)***  (1.020)   
Madzuu -0.418  0.759  2.134 
 (0.890)  (1.090)  (0.997)** 
Makanya -2.130  -1.409   
 (0.839)**  (1.103)   
Vigina -1.682  -0.769   
 (0.740)**  (1.020)   
Exogenous factors1  -0.276  -0.134  0.219 
 (0.255)  (0.321)  (0.289) 
Exogenous factors2  0.168  0.000  -0.151 
 (0.180)  (0.182)  (0.228) 
Exogenous factors3  0.195  -0.339  0.041 
 (0.170)  (0.187)*  (0.191) 
Exogenous factors4  -0.187  -0.202  -0.200 
 (0.168)  (0.195)  (0.191) 
-0.019 0.011 -0.025  Aggregate number of times receiving cash 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.028) 
0.003 -0.017 0.029  Aggregate number of times providing cash 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.019) Social Networks and Technology Adoption    51 
 Inorganic  Mulching  Tumbukiza 
0.006 0.009 0.008  Aggregate number of times receiving in kind 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
0.004 0.000 0.029  Aggregate number of times providing in kind 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.015)* 
0.033 -0.039 0.023  Aggregate number of times receiving labor 
(0.028) (0.034) (0.015) 
0.009 0.019 0.004  Aggregate number of times providing labor 
(0.030) (0.014) (0.010) 
HH receives remittances  0.154  0.529  1.258 
 (0.290)  (0.308)*  (0.471)*** 
0.116 0.072 -0.310  Number of ROSCA memberships 
(0.166) (0.154) (0.202) 
-0.313 -0.403  0.034  Not recovered from earlier shock 
(0.294) (0.318) (0.377) 
-0.317 1.321  0.100  HH head has always lived here 
(0.326) (0.421)*** (0.478) 
-0.207 -0.339  0.090  Number of extension officers in network 
(0.232) (0.248) (0.315) 
0.334 -0.242 -0.155  Prop. of family members who use org. fertilizers 
(0.324) (0.343) (0.391) 
-1.225 -0.046 -0.015  Prop. of transfer network who use org. fertilizers 
(0.835) (0.804) (1.154) 
0.041 -1.945 1.530  Prop. of neighbors who use org. fertilizers 
(0.786) (0.819)** (0.903)* 
0.375 1.581 -1.004  Prop. of friends who use org. fertilizers 
(0.570) (0.632)** (0.835) 
Number of teachers who use org. fertilizers  0.091  -0.140  0.201 
 (0.173)  (0.192)  (0.222) 
Number of preachers who use org. fertilizers  -0.231  -0.643  0.961 
 (0.297)  (0.373)*  (0.479)** 
Number of civil servants who use org. fertilizers  0.096  -0.191  0.031 
 (0.188)  (0.207)  (0.179) 
Number of business owners who use org. fertilizers  -0.028  -0.030  0.016 
 (0.120)  (0.123)  (0.191) 
Has experienced conflicts over fert.run-off  -0.981  -0.359  -0.180 
 (0.597)  (0.599)  (1.032) 
Interaction between farm size and conflicts  0.012  -0.201  -0.094 
 (0.436)  (0.431)  (0.472) 
Constant 2.346  0.952  -4.716 
 (1.000)**  (1.395)  (1.448)*** 
Observations 187  187  203 
Pseudo R
2 0.2856  0.3698  0.5288 
P-value 0.0052  0.0000  0.0000 
Log likelihood  -85  -79  -53 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 Social Networks and Technology Adoption    52 







Extension officer Manyatta  -0.973  -2.979  -1.112 
 (0.770)  (1.069)***  (0.747) 
Extension officer Kianjuki and Kavutiri  0.318  1.051  0.648 
 (0.730)  (0.635)*  (0.700) 
Extension officer Mukangu  -1.514  0.603  -1.506 
 (1.057)  (0.923)  (0.890)* 
Manyatta  2.602 6.490 4.354 
 (1.673)  (1.833)***  (1.327)*** 
Kianjuki  0.713 3.064 2.231 
 (1.739)  (1.631)*  (1.393) 
Kavutiri  3.495 4.238 3.074 
 (1.805)*  (1.674)**  (1.425)** 
Mukangu  1.978 3.532 3.355 
 (1.717)  (1.667)**  (1.383)** 
Ikuyu   3.317   
   (1.716)*   
Ivona     4.182 
     (1.876)** 
Isiagalo 0.709  2.176   
 (1.685)  (1.643)   
Indulo 1.488  4.322   
 (1.953)  (1.832)**   
Kedeta 1.215    2.290 
 (1.589)    (1.112)** 
Kitulu  1.632 2.751 1.324 
 (1.600)  (1.566)*  (1.002) 
Kisienya 1.627    1.583 
 (1.580)    (1.191) 
Luvuka 0.238    1.935 
 (1.689)    (1.078)* 
Madzuu  1.796 2.912 2.513 
 (1.627)  (1.571)*  (1.117)** 
Makanya 0.871  2.865   
 (1.746)  (1.594)*   
Vigina  0.667 2.990 0.956 
 (1.610)  (1.566)*  (1.091) 
Exogenous factors1  0.824  0.176  -0.387 
 (0.337)**  (0.294)  (0.315) 
Exogenous factors2  0.889  0.129  -0.053 
 (0.233)***  (0.193)  (0.206) 
Exogenous factors3  0.231  0.170  -0.027 
 (0.210)  (0.206)  (0.200) 
Exogenous  factors4  0.009 0.130 0.647 
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 Tree  Agroforestry  Windbreak 
-0.007 0.024 0.036  Aggregate number of times receiving cash 
(0.016) (0.013)*  (0.015)** 
-0.042 -0.010 0.040  Aggregate number of times providing cash 
(0.028) (0.017)  (0.018)** 
-0.043 -0.008 0.010  Aggregate number of times receiving in kind 
(0.014)*** (0.015)  (0.013) 
0.021 0.007 -0.010  Aggregate number of times providing in kind 
(0.008)*** (0.010)  (0.013) 
-0.002 -0.036 -0.006  Aggregate number of times receiving labor 
(0.014) (0.028) (0.016) 
0.008 0.020 0.020  Aggregate number of times providing labor 
(0.009) (0.010)* (0.021) 
HH receives remittances  0.704  0.562  0.097 
 (0.382)*  (0.363)  (0.346) 
-0.318 -0.162 0.165  Number of ROSCA memberships 
(0.197) (0.168) (0.174) 
0.740 1.356 -0.222  Not recovered from earlier shock 
(0.384)* (0.393)***  (0.348) 
0.281 0.818 0.418  HH head has always lived here 
(0.428) (0.438)* (0.417) 
0.172 -0.014 0.507  Number of extension officers in network 
(0.292) (0.259)  (0.232)** 
-0.060 -0.867 0.936  Prop. of family members who have terraces etc. 
(0.791) (0.852) (0.809) 
-0.871 1.578 -0.417  Prop. of transfer network who have terraces etc. 
(0.875) (1.088) (0.933) 
0.832 -0.293 -0.996  Prop. of neighbors who have terraces etc. 
(0.752) (0.775) (0.790) 
-0.651 -1.078 1.431  Prop of friends who have terraces etc. 
(0.629) (0.749)  (0.750)* 
-0.938 -1.054 -0.418  Number of teachers who have terraces etc. 
(0.650) (0.753) (0.670) 
-0.562 0.351 0.249  Number of preachers who have terraces etc. 
(0.774) (0.914) (0.705) 
0.937 1.330 1.276  Number of civil servants who have terraces etc. 
(0.513)* (0.567)**  (0.570)** 
-0.253 -0.179 -0.517  Number of business owners who have terraces etc. 
(0.431) (0.487) (0.442) 
-0.012 0.828 -0.421  Prop. of family members who use org. fertilizers 
(0.761) (0.836) (0.770) 
-0.633 -3.462 -0.603  Prop. of transfer network who use org. fertilizers 
(1.101) (1.212)*** (1.132) 
0.775 0.260 0.482  Prop. of neighbors who use org. fertilizers 
(1.052) (1.013) (0.975) 
0.789 2.362 0.486  Prop. of friends who use org. fertilizers 
(0.793) (0.954)** (0.881) Social Networks and Technology Adoption    54 
 Tree  Agroforestry  Windbreak 
Number of teachers who use org. fertilizers  1.065  0.977  0.751 
 (0.646)*  (0.751)  (0.705) 
Number of preachers who use org. fertilizers  -0.477  -0.999  0.019 
 (0.518)  (0.751)  (0.620) 
Number of civil servants who use org. fertilizers  -0.826  -1.223  -1.048 
 (0.509)  (0.548)**  (0.582)* 
Number of business owners who use org. fertilizers  0.031  0.308  0.810 
 (0.401)  (0.480)  (0.409)** 
Has experienced conflicts over boundary trees  -0.054  0.551  0.672 
 (0.433)  (0.438)  (0.472) 
Interaction between farm size and conflicts  -0.071  -0.331  -0.376 
 (0.159)  (0.156)**  (0.166)** 
Constant -2.164  -4.851  -5.350 
 (1.814)  (1.717)***  (1.621)*** 
Observations 187  187  187 
Pseudo R
2 0.4593  0.4786  0.3908 
P-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0006 
Log  likelihood  -69 -65 -66 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 Table 6. Number of years ago respondent adopted tumbukiza. Poisson regression. 
 
Label  Coef. Est.    Label  Coef. Est. 
Probability of being an adopter   5.209    HH head has always lived here    -0.463 
        of tumbukiza  (1.038)***              (0.278)* 
Respondent's age   -0.008    Number of extension officers   -0.443 
          (0.009)            in network  (0.153)*** 
Extension officer Manyatta        -1.012    Prop. of family members  0.361 
          (0.341)***            who use organic fertilizers  (0.395) 
Extension officer Kianjuki    1.470    Prop. of transfer network  -2.642 
        and Kavutiri  (0.377)***            who use organic fertilizers  (0.680)*** 
Extension officer Mukangu         1.610    Proportion of neighbors  -0.641 
          (0.587)***            who use organic fertilizers  (0.597) 
Manyatta          3.857    Proportion of friends  -0.987 
          (1.001)***            who use organic fertilizers  (0.374)*** 
Kianjuki          4.790    Number of  teachers  -0.215 
          (1.087)***            who use organic fertilizers  (0.295) 
Kavutiri          2.051    Number of  teachers  1.731 
          (1.046)**            who use organic fertilizers  (0.471)*** 
Mukangu   4.053    Number of  civil servants  0.347 
          (1.140)***            who use organic fertilizers  (0.213) 
Ivona     2.352    Number of  business owners  -0.141 
          (1.747)            who use organic fertilizers  (0.257) 
Kedeta    4.520    Prop of family members who       -0.807 
          (1.028)***            practice tumbukiza   (0.528) 
Madzuu    3.048    Prop of transfer network    -0.066 
          (1.187)**            who practice tumbukiza (0.743) 
Aggregate times receiving cash   -0.025    Prop of neighbors  0.959 
          (0.019)            who practice tumbukiza (0.579)* 
Aggregate times providing cash      0.042    Prop of friends  1.233 
          (0.012)***            who practice tumbukiza (0.413)*** 
Aggregate times receiving in kind   0.037    Number of  teachers   -0.064 
          (0.009)***            who practice tumbukiza (0.366) 
Aggregate times providing in kind   -0.026    Number of  preachers   -4.284 
          (0.005)***            who practice tumbukiza (1.051)*** 
Aggregate times receiving labor     0.010    Number of  civil servants   -0.740 
          (0.007)            who practice tumbukiza (0.275)*** 
Aggregate times providing labor     -0.010    Number of  business owners   -0.044 
          (0.006)            who practice tumbukiza (0.397) 
HH receives remittances   1.001    Constant          -1.477 
          (0.263)***              (1.084) 
Number Of ROSCA memberships    -0.157    Observations      203 
          (0.168)    Pseudo R
2 0.7882 
Not recovered from earlier shock     0.950    P-value  0.0000 
          (0.284)***    Log likelihood -162 
Density of respondent's network   -0.202       
          (0.060)***       
        
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Social Networks and Technology Adoption    56 
Table 7. Adoption of soil and water conservation techniques, all factors. Using secondary and subset data. 
Probit estimation. 
 
 Terraces  Drainage 
structures 
Exogenous factors 2  2.168  -0.985 
 (1.285)*  (0.646) 
Exogenous factors 3  -2.066  -3.122 
 (1.607)  (1.696)* 
Has experienced conflicts over water run-off  -2.103  -3.137 
 (1.843)  (1.832)* 
Interaction farm size and conflicts  1.776  1.110 
 (1.538)  (0.907) 
Freeman Degrees Index for network transfers  11.958  0.754 
 (6.454)*  (1.213) 
Freeman Degrees for discussing terracing etc.  -1.776  0.219 
 (1.103)  (0.587) 
Freeman Degrees for adopting terracing etc.  1.057  -0.318 
 (0.910)  (0.498) 
HH head has always lived here  -9.685   
 (5.684)*   
Number of extension officers in network  6.165  -2.276 
 (3.669)*  (1.099)** 
Member of village development committee  -5.477  0.780 
 (2.903)*  (1.445) 
Member of farmers' group    -3.644 
   (2.572) 
Member of women's group  1.098  -4.853 
 (1.499)  (2.377)** 
Member of youth group  8.853  0.727 
 (5.045)*  (1.236) 
Amount rewarded in weak ties experiment  -0.011  0.008 
 (0.010)  (0.009) 
Found price of district input    3.026 
   (1.968) 
Constant 13.021  -3.468 
 (7.178)*  (4.685) 
Observations 45  45 
Pseudo R
2 0.6311  0.5225 
P-value 0.0028  0.0521 
Log likelihood  -9  -11 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Exogenous factors 1  2.277    -0.295 
 (1.384)*    (0.846) 
Exogenous factors 2  0.509  0.263  1.578 
 (0.642)  (0.413)  (0.885)* 
Exogenous factors 3    -1.108   
   (0.651)*   
Has experienced conflicts over fertilizer run-off  -4.678     
 (2.423)*     
Interaction farm size and conflicts  1.967     
 (1.282)     
Freeman Degrees Index for network transfers  3.598  -1.378  -1.175 
 (2.517)  (0.960)  (1.103) 
Freeman Degrees for discussing organic fertilizers  1.601  0.561   
 (1.281)  (0.451)   
Freeman Degrees for adopting organic fertilizers  -1.933  -0.224   
 (1.478)  (0.401)   
Freeman Degrees for discussion tumbukiza    0.035   
   (0.203)   
Freeman Degrees for adopting tumbukiza    -0.798   
   (0.436)*   
Density of respondent's network  0.789     
 (0.547)     
HH head has always lived here    1.063  1.727 
   (0.946)  (1.357) 
Number of extension officers in network  -8.338  -0.532  1.727 
 (4.623)*  (0.549)  (0.856)** 
Member of village development committee  7.747  0.120   
 (18.944)  (0.728)   
Member of farmers' group  -2.403  -0.378   
 (2.060)  (0.813)   
Member of women's group  -0.066  -1.158   
 (0.826)  (0.774)   
Member of youth group    1.139   
   (1.012)   
Group Membership Index      2.572 
     (1.329)* 
Amount rewarded in weak ties experiment  -0.016  -0.006  0.007 
 (0.009)*  (0.003)**  (0.009) 
Found price of district input  1.285  1.978  -3.303 
 (1.184)  (1.426)  (2.207) 
Constant 7.996  1.301  -5.413 
 (5.159)  (1.708)  (4.740) Social Networks and Technology Adoption    58 
  Inorganic Mulching Tumbukiza 
Observations 45  47  49 
Pseudo R
2 0.5176  0.4120  0.6816 
P-value 0.0379  0.0455  0.0000 
Log likelihood  -11  -18  -8 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Exogenous factors 1    0.458  0.519 
   (0.573)  (0.799) 
Exogenous factors 2  1.782  0.973  0.828 
 (0.940)*  (0.495)**  (0.686) 
Exogenous factors 3  1.640     
 (1.556)     
Has experienced conflicts over trees  -4.316  -0.745  2.145 
 (1.792)** (0.948)  (1.596) 
Interaction farm size and conflicts  0.462  -0.080  -0.010 
 (0.598)  (0.392)  (0.450) 
Freeman Degrees Index for network transfers  -0.053  0.904  1.621 
 (1.409)  (0.961)  (2.101) 
0.596 -0.295 -4.674  Freeman Degrees discussing terraces, etc. 
(1.181) (0.909) (2.629)* 
0.214 1.049  1.546  Freeman Degrees adoption of terraces, etc. 
(0.504) (0.622)* (0.804)* 
0.286 -0.149  1.784  Freeman Degrees discussing organic fertilizers 
(1.205) (0.746)  (1.813) 
-1.309 -0.675  0.939  Freeman Degrees adopting organic fertilizers 
(1.151) (0.596)  (1.160) 
HH head has always lived here  1.134  1.462  2.778 
 (1.192)  (0.899)  (1.587)* 
Number of extension officers in network  -0.996  -2.590  -0.332 
 (1.143)  (1.042)**  (1.093) 
Member of village development committee  1.425  -0.410  -4.555 
 (1.401)  (1.154)  (2.718)* 
Member of farmers' group  1.165  -0.961  -3.728 
 (2.020)  (1.040)  (2.162)* 
Member of women's group  2.226  -0.227  -3.090 
 (1.387)  (0.725)  (1.862)* 
Member of youth group  2.059  1.993  5.275 
 (1.814)  (1.341)  (2.579)** 
Amount rewarded in weak ties experiment  -0.003  -0.003  0.000 
 (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Found price of district input  -1.333  0.523  -1.295 
 (1.752)  (0.987)  (1.860) 
Constant 2.782  2.345  0.998 
 (2.875)  (2.043)  (3.270) 
Observations 45  45  45 
Pseudo R
2 0.6653  0.4313  0.6196 
P-value 0.0009  0.0632  0.0053 
Log likelihood  -10  -18  -11 
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Social Networks and Technology Adoption    60 
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